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Abstract
In thinking about the rise of the Anthropocene, an important facet of this looming new era
remains under-explored: namely, how cultural identity, and its tangible and intangible markers,
are to be renegotiated and protected. Notwithstanding that the origins of international heritage
law lie in protecting heritage in times of crisis (wartime and natural or man-made disasters),
regimes under UNESCO for safeguarding cultural heritage in international law are ill-prepared
for the challenges of the Anthropocene. A particular question that needs to be considered is the
protection in international law of cultural heritage and identity when communities are displaced
from their homes. Because international cultural heritage law is connected to state territoriality,
states have the ultimate authorizing power over the meanings and uses of cultural heritage. In
the past, this power has at times been used to the detriment of minority groups contesting the
majoritarian state. But how might this power play out in a context where communities are forced
to move? What, if anything, can international heritage law do to ensure that these populations,
who have already lost their homes and livelihoods, can maintain their cultural identity through
the protection of their heritage? I argue that international law’s separation between the cultural
and biological facets of human existence presents a major obstacle to safeguarding the cultures
of migrant and refugee groups, ultimately frustrating the very objectives that this separation was
meant to achieve, namely, the protection of these populations. Only by reintegrating biology and
culture can international law create the means for reimagining civilization in the Anthropocene.
Keywords: cultural heritage, Anthropocene, refugees, migrants, UNESCO, intangible cultural
heritage, territoriality
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I. INTRODUCTION
The rise of the Anthropocene draws increasing attention in the social
sciences more generally. And, yet, much of the concern relates to the
immediate impact on human livelihoods, comprising access to clean
water, food, sanitation, and disappearing territory. Those questions are
indeed most pressing and urgent, but in focusing on them, we also create
a blind spot that prevents us from thinking beyond that immediacy. More
specifically, when we think about our responses to the Anthropocene,
much of our focus seems to be somewhat dystopian, told in a language
of crisis in which our social and cultural systems will collapse, and a
Copyright © 2018 – Lucas Lixinski, Published by Lembaga Pengkajian Hukum Internasional
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version of the state of nature will set in.
The bright side of that framing is that it is a powerful call to action.
Framed as a crisis,1 the Anthropocene and its potential consequences
become unavoidable, as is the need to address and adapt to them.
But there is also a dark side: our consistent focus is on the biological
elements of human survival as a race, forgetting that, if we are to be
more than a race, and be in fact a civilization, there are other elements
that are equally important to consider. That is the powerful inclination I
wish to push against in this article.
International law has long articulated a separation between the
biological and cultural aspects of human existence. This separation
can be seen from the fact that, for instance, the Genocide Convention,2
excluded late in its drafting the idea of cultural genocide.3 Conversely,
international law addressing culture has for the most part, and until
recently, excluded the connection between cultural heritage and human
goals, instead of focusing on civilization as filtered by a class of experts
one step removed from the everyday practice and attachment to said
culture.4 This gap has significant ripple effects in how we imagine
humanity in times of crises: either as human groups upon whom crisis
bears so heavily that their culture no longer matters; or as culture
whose safeguarding is a low priority unless an expert-driven voice of
the “international community” says they are worthy of our attention.
Nothing could be further from the truth.
Human groups move from assemblages of individuals towards
communities on the basis of a shared culture. This shared culture
enables a sense of belonging, of existing; it allows for better outcomes
for groups as they move across borders, whether voluntarily or forcibly;
it generates resilience in the face of vulnerability; it galvanizes action
and provides hope. Yet, international law’s separation of culture and
Hilary Charlesworth, “International Law: A Discipline of Crisis,” The Modern Law
Review 65:3, (2002).
2
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened
for signature 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (entered into force 12 January 1951).
3
Elisa Novic, The Concept of Cultural Genocide: An International Law Perspective,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
4
Lucas Lixinski, “International Cultural Heritage Regimes, International Law and
the Politics of Expertise,” International Journal of Cultural Property 20:4 (2013).
1
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biology does not allow us to make those linkages clearly, and, as we
discuss and prepare responses to the imminent or already ongoing
consequences of the Anthropocene, it is urgent that we bridge that gap.
In this article, I wish to focus on one aspect of the international
legal response to the Anthropocene in the context of the culture-biology
gap. Specifically, I will examine the cultural rights of migrants and
refugees with respect to their cultural heritage. I focus on groups whose
movement has been forced, either by reason of persecution, economic
need, or disappearing territory. I exclude for our present purposes of
voluntary migration. In the context of forced movement, I argue that
international law’s separation between the cultural and biological
facets of human existence presents a major obstacle to safeguarding
the cultures of migrant and refugee groups, ultimately frustrating the
very objectives that this separation was meant to achieve, namely, the
protection of these populations. It is therefore urgent that we bridge
that gap. For international law more generally, bridging the gap means
international legal responses that move beyond the short-sighted
immediacy of our perception of a crisis, bringing along better outcomes
for affected human groups, and a reimagining of how we perceive
threats posed to our existence not just as biological entities, but as a
civilization. For international cultural heritage law, it means breathing
life into the “human dimension” of cultural heritage and making a
reality of the promise of cultural heritage as a means to promote human
emancipation and other rights-related goals.
In order to support this claim, the article proceeds as follows:
the next section (2) focuses on a discussion of international cultural
heritage law in the Anthropocene, highlighting existing regimes and
instruments under the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Next, I will focus on the oftenneglected matter of the discussion of the cultural rights of migrants and
refugees as an international legal concern (3). Taken together, these
sections will more clearly delineate the biology-culture gap mentioned
above and will provide the basis for a discussion of state international
legal obligations towards the cultural heritage of migrant and refugee
groups, whether they are the state of origin of these groups (4) or the
receiving state (5). On that basis, I will briefly discuss the need to
3
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untether international law on culture from territoriality and the nationstate, an important if elusive and aspirational challenge (6). Concluding
remarks follow (7).
II. INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL HERITAGE LAW IN THE
ANTHROPOCENE
Cultural heritage, in international law, is a broad and fairly
fragmented category. Under UNESCO standard-setting instruments,
it comprises manifestations of culture as varied as monuments and
sites,5 cultural objects,6 shipwrecks and other underwater artifacts and
installations,7 buildings or groups of buildings,8 archives,9 landscapes,10
and manifestations of living heritage known as intangible cultural
heritage (comprising social rituals, dance, music, festivals, legal
systems and other ways of knowing nature and the universe).11 Over
time, newer instruments have been designed (and old ones revised
through their implementation guidelines) so as to focus increasingly on
living cultures, which has both a tangible (the connection that people
feel to sites and objects) and intangible dimension (social practices that
may or may not involve physical heritage).12
UNESCO activity with respect to heritage has often gained
momentum in the aftermath of a crisis. The first treaty under its aegis,
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,
opened for signature 16 November 1972, 1037 UNTS 151 (entered into force 15 December 1975) (WHC), Art. 1.
6
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, opened for signature 14 November
1970, 823 UNTS 231 (entered into force 24 April 1972) (1970 Convention), Art.1.
7
Convention on the Protection of the Underwater Cultural Heritage, opened for signature 2 November 2001, 2562 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 January 2009) (UCHC),
Art. 1(1).
8
WHC, Art. 1.
9
1970 Convention, Art. 1(j).
10
UNESCO Recommendation on the Historic Urban Landscape, including a glossary
of definitions (adopted 10 November 2011).
11
Convention for Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage, opened for signature 17 October 2003, 2368 UNTS 3 (entered into force 20 April 2006) (ICHC),
Art. 2(1).
12
Lucas Lixinski, Intangible Cultural Heritage in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2013.
5
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the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property in Wartime,13 responds
directly to the pillage and destruction of cultural heritage during World
War II.14 Likewise, the World Heritage Convention (WHC) gained
international diplomatic momentum for its adoption in no small part
because of the flooding of Venice and Florence.15 Therefore, the
evolution of the international legal safeguarding of cultural heritage is
closely tied with crises.
One of the effects of this tie is that several UNESCO instruments
contain specific language that protects heritage in difficult times. The
WHC, for instance, includes specific language on disasters, and creates
as a special mechanism a List of World Heritage in Danger.16 This list
is meant to further galvanize international action to safeguard heritage
threatened by major changes in human societies (even if in recent
practice it has been more often than not perceived as simply a “naming
and shaming” device).17
Threats to heritage brought about by the Anthropocene effectively
split heritage into two large domains : a heritage that is inextricably,
and as a matter of fact, tied to a territory (such as world heritage and
underwater heritage); and heritage that is not tied to a territory (such as
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict
with Regulations for the Execution of the Convention, opened for signature 14 May
1954, 249 UNTS 240 (entered into force 7 August 1956) (1954 Hague Convention).
14
See generally Lynn H. Nicholas, The Rape of Europa: The Fate of Europe’s Treasures in the Third Reich and the Second World War, Vintage Books, 1995.
15
See generally Rodney Harrison, Heritage: Critical Approaches, Routledge, 2013.
16
WHC, Art. 11(4): “The Committee shall establish, keep up to date and publish,
whenever circumstances shall so require, under the title of “List of World Heritage
in Danger”, a list of the property appearing in the World Heritage List for the conservation of which major operations are necessary and for which assistance has been
requested under this Convention. […] The list may include only such property forming part of the cultural and natural heritage as is threatened by serious and specific
dangers, such as the threat of disappearance caused by […] the outbreak or the threat
of an armed conflict; calamities and cataclysms; serious fires, earthquakes, landslides;
volcanic eruptions; changes in water level, floods and tidal waves. The Committee
may at any time, in case of urgent need, make a new entry in the List of World Heritage in Danger and publicize such entry immediately.”
17
Magdalena Marcinkowska, “Between Exclusion and Inclusion: On the Challenges Facing World Heritage Preservation Efforts: Interview with Mechtild Rössler”,
Santander Art and Culture Law Review, vol. 3, no. 2, 2017.
13
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movable and intangible heritage). This categorization matters because
responses will be very different : heritage tied to territory is at the mercy
of changes brought about by the Anthropocene, whereas other heritage
can, at least, as a matter of fact, be displaced in response to changes.
The primary focus of this article is on the latter category. Intangible
cultural heritage, in particular has been the object of specific analysis in
the context of climate change, suggesting that stronger safeguarding of
(intangible) cultural heritage is needed in countries more exposed to the
effects of climate change.18
In the former category, though, Venice is a key example. As
a World Heritage Site, and the object of a key campaign that led to
the adoption of the World Heritage Convention, this archipelagic city
is an international symbol of cultural heritage-related responses to
Anthropocene challenges. As the city is threatened by rising sea-levels,
commentators remind us that, as important as the plight of Venetians is :
“when you think about the loss of Venice, [it is] not the Venetians
who are the topmost on most people’s minds[ it is] the loss of a
beautiful and historic city that has played an enormous role in the
development of Western Civilization. […] The loss of Venice is
about the loss of a part of ourselves that reaches back in time and
binds us together as civilized people.”19
With respect to the other category of heritage for our purposes,
though, the challenge rests not with what is possible as a matter of fact,
but rather as a matter of law. Because of our state-centric paradigm in
international law, heritage is conceptualized and safeguarded in its ties
to a territorial state. So, movable heritage is closely tied to national
identity, and existing instruments prevent its movement across borders
without the authorization of the territorial state;20 intangible heritage is
safeguarded only within the boundaries of the state party that recognizes
said intangible heritage as important.21
Hee-Eun Kim, “Changing Climate, Changing Culture: Adding the Climate Change
Dimension to the Protection of Intangible Cultural Heritage”, International Journal
of Cultural Property, vol. 18, 2011, 259.
19
Jeff Goodell, The Water Will Come: Rising Seas, Sinking Cities, and the Remaking
of the Civilized World, Black Inc., 2017.
20
1970 Convention, Arts., 6-7.
21
ICHC, Art. 11.
18
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This state-centrism, and ensuring territorial connection is at odds
with the nature of the heritage, but it aligns with the international legal
paradigm under which the relevant treaties were concluded.22 A key
consequence of this alignment is the severing of ties between heritage
and communities or groups, even if they could be useful to promote
resilience and adaptation to Anthropocene-related events.23 In this
way, international heritage law’s enabling of the uses of heritage for
nationalistic projects and its ensuing tie to territory helps create and
reinforce the biology-culture divide. The biology-culture divide is
further reinforced in the Anthropocene or climate change discourse,
where culture-related aspects are seldom mentioned, and biological
or natural aspects are foregrounded. That happens even within
UNESCO, in its reporting on the matter (led by the science branch
of the organization).24 Further, international law’s categorization into
subfields and silos maintains the divide in ways that fail to “reflect the
messy, complex interconnectedness of the issue” of climate change and
the Anthropocene.25
This close tie to territory is a product of UNESCO standard-setting,
though, and does not match pre-UNESCO practice with respect to
movable heritage in particular. As documented by Andrzej Jakubowski,
there is abundant state practice prior to relevant UNESCO treaties
that suggests that a people’s cultural heritage follows the people first,
and territory second.26 It was with the advent of UNESCO, and the
decolonization process in Africa and Asia that heritage was once again
For a collection of essays considering cultural heritage and climate change beyond
the law, see David C. Harvey and Jim Perry, eds., The Future of Heritage as Climates
Change: Loss, Adaptation and Creativity, Routledge, 2015.
23
Kim, see note 19, 269.
24
As discussed by Kim, Ibid, 270-271. See also a recent issue of the UNESCO Courier, the organization’s premier public outreach vehicle, dedicated to the Anthropocene. It does not mention cultural heritage at all, and mentions social and cultural
aspects only inasmuch as they relate to impacts of the Anthropocene on geophysical
features. UNESCO, “Welcome to the Anthropocene!”, The UNESCO Courier, AprilJune 2018.
25
Mutatis mutandis, see Jane McAdam, “Environmental Migration” in Alexander
Betts, ed., Global Migration Governance, Oxford University Press, 2011, 159 (referring more broadly to the problem of climate-induced migration).
26
Andrzej Jakubowski, State Succession in Cultural Property, Oxford University
Press, 2015, 323.
22
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tied to (artificial)27 territorial boundaries. An unintended consequence
of this tie is an entire set of regimes under UNESCO that replicate
and reinforce territoriality and matching statehood at the expense of
cultural ties that people may have to their own culture. This mismatch
is particularly experienced with respect to the heritage of migrant or
refugee groups, discussed in the next section.
III. MIGRANTS, REFUGEES, AND CULTURAL HERITAGE
The biology-culture divide exists as well in the legal regimes that
focus on the rights of migrants and refugees, in spite of the widespread
acknowledgment of cultural elements being integral to the identification
and unity of diasporic groups.28 In these treaties, including most notably
the 1951 Refugee Convention29 and the International Convention on
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of
their Families (CRMW),30 there is no reference to culture in relation
to these groups, let alone cultural heritage. A recent report from the
International Organization for Migration on indigenous international
migrants, for instance, makes no reference to culture, even if indigenous
rights in general are often framed around culture.31 And an extensive
proposal for a treaty-specific for persons displaced by climate change,
while acknowledging the important role of culture as a background
consideration, dedicates very little space to the discussion of cultural
Makau Mutua, “Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry”,
Michigan Journal of International Law, vol. 16, 1995.
28
Lester Edwin J. Ruiz, “In Pursuit of the ‘Body Politic’: Ethics, Spirituality, and
Diaspora”, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, vol. 9, 1999, 636-637.
29
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, opened for signature 28 July 1951,
189 UNTS 137 (entered into force 22 April 1954) (Refugee Convention).
30
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers
and Members of their Families, opened for signature 18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS
3 (entered into force 1 July 2003) (CRMW).
31
Erika Yamada and Marcelo Torelly, eds., Aspectos jurídicos da atenção aos indígenas migrantes da Venezuela para o Brasil, Organização Internacional para as
Migrações, 2018. For the connection between indigenous rights advocacy and culture,
with a critical analysis of its unintended consequences, see Karen Engle, The Elusive Promise of Indigenous Development: Culture, Rights, Strategy, Duke University
Press, 2010.
27
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rights of these migrants.32 Yet, it is well-documented that migrant and
refugee groups constitute diasporas that are connected via their cultural
heritage and practices. Why is there such a disconnect between the law
and the reality of these communities ?
Part of the reason is the mentality of the urgency of crises involving
mass displacement of people, discussed in the previous section. The
only concern is the immediate biological survival of the individuals in
those groups, who are treated as such. It is very little in international
law and the individual rights paradigm reining under it since after
World War II that refers to migrants or refugees as collectivities, even
if their flows often happen collectively. Therefore, by being treated as
individuals, it is easy to focus on their biological existence, and neglect
the elements that bind these individuals together, namely, their shared
culture and heritage. Even if the Refugee Convention requires persons
claiming refugee status to prove their belonging to a persecuted group,33
cultural belonging is only used to inform an individual’s situation, and
is thus only part of the background or factual matrix of the assessment,
rather than a key concern. The focus is not in redressing the persecution
of the group as such, but rather allowing the individual entry into the
territory of the receiving state. An unintended consequence of this “deculturalization” of refugees and migrants, particularly refugees, is that
it makes it easier to dehumanize them, which is a crucial problem in
refugee law- and policy-making.34
Secondly, there is an obvious disinterest from states in adding
cultural protections to relevant instruments and regimes, whether they
David Hodgkinson and others, “The Hour when the Ship Comes In’: A Convention
for Persons Displaced by Climate Change”, Monash University Law Review, vol.
36, no. 1, 2010, 12 and 42 (on the importance of culture) and 44-45 (on intangible
cultural heritage).
33
Refugee Convention, Art. 1: “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for
reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as
a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”
34
Victoria M. Esses, “Immigration, Migration, and Culture” in Oliver Braddick and
others, eds., Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Psychology, Oxford University Press,
2018.
32
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are the sending or the receiving state. For sending states (or the states
of origin of these groups), often the reasons why these groups leave is
because they are being persecuted (particularly in the case of refugees).
And the persecution of these groups means there is little to no interest
in preserving their culture. Even if the cause of distress is the state’s
failure by virtue of conflict, one can hardly expect a failed state to be
able to address issues around culture and heritage, particularly since
these considerations are traditionally treated as secondary.
From the perspective of receiving states, there is also little to no
interest in providing protection to the culture and heritage of incoming
groups of migrants or refugees. Not only is there a risk that the receiving
state may run afoul its international obligations if, for instance, it
allows refugees to bring movable heritage (under the terms of the
1970 Convention, as discussed above), but, perhaps most crucially,
protecting cultural distinctiveness of incoming migrants and refugees
can destabilize (even if only momentarily) the receiving state’s social
structures, a concern even in multicultural states. Further, incoming
foreigners have no political rights in the receiving polity, and their
concerns can thus easily be pushed aside.
Nevertheless, culture is centrally important to refugee or migrant
groups, especially nationals of small island nations, upon whom the
impacts of the Anthropocene are being felt first.35 Particularly important
in this respect is a cultural heritage that is not inextricably tied to the
land, since it can move across borders. Intangible cultural heritage is
notably mentioned in studies of migration and culture, particularly
as tied to religion36 and culinary practices.37 It is important to note,
though, that the current international legal regime on intangible cultural
heritage largely excludes religion per se,38 and that food practices that
For a collection of essays tying cultures and small island nations, see Tim Curtis,
ed., Islands as Crossroads: Sustaining Cultural Diversity in Small Island Developing
States, UNESCO Publishing, 2011.
36
Ajaya Kumar Sahoo and Dave Sangha, “Diaspora and cultural heritage: the case
of Indians in Canada”, Asian Ethnicity, vol. 11, no.1, 2010, 81-94 and 88-89.
37
Pnina Werbner, “Migration and Culture” in Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J.
Tichenor, eds., Oxford Handbook of the Politics of International Migration, Oxford
University Press, 2012, 215-242 and 221-230.
38
See Benedetta Ubertazzi, “Article 2(2)” in Janet Blake and Lucas Lixinski, eds.,
Commentary to the 2003 Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural
35
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have gained international recognition as cultural heritage are only those
suggested by the territorial state, therefore tending to be quintessentially
national (such as the French gastronomic meal). Some cross-border
culinary practices have gained recognition as cultural heritage, though,
pointing that it may be possible to engage certain traditions brought
in by migrant groups that way.39 Further, cultural objects that embody
intangible heritage, particularly those of everyday life, help enliven
diasporic culture and practices.40
Further, refugee and migrant groups’ ability to bring and maintain
some of their heritage paradoxically can facilitate their process of
integration in the receiving state,41 as supported by psychological
studies in this area.42 It is therefore in said state’s interest to protect
their heritage and cultural rights, and have their heritage recorded and
safeguarded in museums and other cultural institutions,43 even if they
do not have the political agency to demand so of the state. Cultural
institutions, in particular, by validating the refugee or migrant group’s
culture, can validate said culture and enhance its value even for the
community themselves (let alone for the host state).44 There is of course
a risk, however, that these institutions will replace migrant and refugee
groups’ agency in determining the fate of their own culture, and that is
a risk to be avoided, particularly within the host state.
But how can and do these interests translate into international legal
obligations, either as a matter of existing international law (lege lata) or
aspirational obligations (lege ferenda)? The next two sections explore
some of these possibilities, from the perspectives of states of origin of
migrants and refugees as well as receiving states.

Heritage, Oxford University Press, forthcoming (manuscript on file).
39
For a survey of international legal responses to food as cultural heritage, see Lucas
Lixinski, “Food as heritage and multi-level international legal governance”, International Journal of Cultural Property (forthcoming 2018).
40
Saphinaz-Amal Naguib, “Museums, Diaspora and the Sustainability of Intangible
Cultural Heritage”, Sustainability, vol. 5, 2013.
41
Werbner, see note 38, 215.
42
Esses, see note 38.
43
Naguib, see note 41.
44
Ibid, 2186.
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IV. OBLIGATIONS OF THE STATE OF ORIGIN
As indicated above, obligations imposed on the state of origin
of migrant groups are difficult to specify and enforce, as these states
are often troubled or even failing or failed states. Because of these
difficulties, many of these obligations are de lege ferenda, but they are
grounded in existing international law. A challenge in identifying these
obligations lies in the biology-culture divide, in that it prevents the
dialogue between cultural heritage obligations (normally interpreted as
rights of states over “their” heritage) and other bodies of international
law more attentive to the needs of migrant and refugee groups (which
tend to focus on biological, rather than cultural, needs). That said,
existing or aspirational international legal obligations can be identified
with respect to three different phases: the migrant or refugee group’s
departure; the group’s separation from the state of origin; and possibly
their return to the state of origin.
With respect to obligations upon the group’s departure, a key
obligation related to cultural heritage is to allow safe passage of cultural
objects and artifacts that speak primarily to that group’s cultural
heritage. Those artifacts can either be themselves the heritage (in the
sense of the 1970 Convention), or they can be (alternatively or in
addition) instruments for the practice of the group’s intangible cultural
heritage. To be sure, the line of what is that group’s heritage versus the
shared heritage or identity of other groups within the nation is often
blurred, as states often, in their multicultural accommodation projects,
weave minority heritage into narratives of national cultural identity. A
test of cultural proximity is thus necessary, to decide whether a certain
cultural artifact belongs primarily with the migrant or refugee group,
or with another group (or even the nation-state as the representative of
the collectivity). This test could be similar to existing tests that try and
identify whether a certain practice is essential to a belief system for
the purposes of freedom of belief and religion.45 If a certain practice is
essential to the set of beliefs (which does not need to be a religion, it
can be a set of cultural and social practices), then it warrants protection
under international law. This test is in line with the balancing test applied
European Commission on Human Rights, Arrowsmith v United Kingdom (Application No 7050/75), Comm Rep 1978, 19 DR 5. For a further discussion, see Lixinski,
see note 13, 166-167.
45
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by the Inter-American Court with respect to the competing rights of
indigenous peoples and private parties.46 In determining who could
exercise the same right over the same interest (in the Inter-American
Court’s case, fittingly for our purposes, the right to property), the Court
considered the right’s relationship to the core of the identity of the
affected parties. Transposing both tests to our present context, it means
that, if the artifact in question is essential for a certain cultural practice,
and said cultural practice is more important for the continuation of the
group’s identity than it is for other stakeholders, then the leaving group
should be entitled to take said object with them upon their departure. It
thus falls on the state of origin to issue the export certificate required by
the 1970 Convention47 in order to ensure the safe passage of the artifact.
After the group’s departure, and during their time away from the
state of origin, there are two key obligations upon the state, both of
which being primarily negative (but with corresponding positive duties).
Specifically, they are obligations not to impair or destroy conditions
tied to the continuity of the culture and heritage of the departing group.
Those are obligations not to destroy (or allow others to destroy, or to
allow to fall into disrepair) cultural heritage, whether sites or objects,
that are central to the group’s culture but have stayed in the state of
origin. Similarly, the state has an obligation not to retaliate (or allow
others to retaliate) against members of the departing group that may
have left, by preventing or punishing cultural practices. Sadly, often
enough the latter happens (even if it can amount to the international
crime of persecution), particularly when the group is persecuted in their
state of origin. In those cases, it is incumbent on any of the parties
to a relevant heritage treaty to enforce relevant international legal
obligations as erga omnes partes,48 even if there are notable practical
difficulties with this approach, the discussion of which goes beyond the
scope of this article.49
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, IACtHR Series C no 125, 17 June 2005, paras.
146-148.
47
1970 Convention, Art. 6.
48
See eg Francesco Francioni, “Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural
Heritage as a Shared Interest of Humanity”, Michigan Journal of International Law,
vol. 25, 2003-2004.
49
But see Lucas Lixinski and Vassilis Tzevelekos, “The Strained, Elusive and Wide46
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And, should the group ever return to the state of origin, the said state
is under an obligation to welcome back the group and accommodate their
culture, on the group’s own terms and in accordance with their expressed
desires, in national multicultural projects. That accommodation is
particularly important as culture is transformed in the receiving state,
or, more drastically, the diaspora becomes the only place where the
heritage is practiced.50 Those obligations mean allowing artifacts to be
brought back into the country, and also allowing these communities to
(re-)occupy spaces they have traditionally used for cultural practices,
even if they may have been listed as protected monuments since the
group’s departure and are considered out of bounds for everyday use
by virtue of domestic heritage law. State duties in this area can also
extend to the inclusion of cultural and social practices into national
inventories of intangible cultural heritage, with the consequent funds
necessary for the safeguarding of said heritage, particularly important
given the likely urgency of safeguarding these fragile re-introduced
cultural manifestations.
Out of these three moments (upon departure, during time away,
upon return), the obligations upon departure are the ones most solidly
grounded upon existing law (de lege lata), using a combination of
existing international cultural heritage law and international human
rights law. Other obligations either depend on the implementation of
doctrines that currently exist in international law in theory, but that
present practical or political difficulties, like erga omnes partes. But the
survey above shows that there are important elements that cannot be
disregarded by states of origin, even when their policies and practices
are the reason why people are displacing themselves. The state that
receives these groups also has a number of obligations, some of which
mirror or follow directly from the state of origin’s obligations in this
space, and others that respond to idiosyncrasies of the receiving state.
These are the object of the next section.
Ranging Relationship between International Cultural Heritage Law and the Law of
State Responsibility: From Collective Enforcement to Concurrent Responsibility” in
Alessandro Chechi and Marc-Andre Renold, eds., Cultural Heritage Law and Ethics:
Mapping Recent Developments, Schulthess, 2017.
50
Naguib, see note 41, 2183.
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V. OBLIGATIONS OF THE RECEIVING STATE
In theory, the receiving state is best placed to do more with respect
to safeguarding the heritage of migrant and refugee groups (at least
the heritage, as discussed above, that is not inextricably tied to the
territory). That said, as also mentioned above, there are fewer incentives
for the receiving state to take action. The migrant or refugee groups
do not have political rights in the new polity immediately, meaning
they cannot influence domestic law- and policy-making in their favor,
nor can express their grievances through the electoral process. They
“are considered as mere instruments of economic and demographic
planning, not as human beings endowed with dignity and rights.”51
Further, it is not in the interest of many receiving states to undertake
action they often perceive as disruptive of their own cultural heritage
and identity narratives (a “fantasy of domination” in which refugees
and other migrants “take over” the state, being incumbent upon the
state “to either restore or maintain a ‘proper’ balance to multicultural
diversity”).52 Finally, the obligations upon receiving states have to do
with the immediate accommodation of incoming individuals, measured
against their biological existence, rather than the structural causes
that led them to flee as individuals or groups, which often connect to
culture but also mean scrutinizing the internal situation in another state
(their domain réservé).53 Therefore, reasons for traditional voluntarist
international legal structures and the biology-culture divide contribute
to reducing the scope of presently expected obligations incumbent
upon receiving states with respect to the cultural heritage of incoming
migrant and refugee groups.
However, there are reasons to rethink this status quo. First, there are a
range of long-term benefits for accommodating the culture and heritage
of migrant and refugee groups, particularly in that groups whose culture
Alessandro Chechi, “Migrants’ Cultural Rights at the Confluence of International
Human Rights Law and International Cultural Heritage Law”, International Human
Rights Law Review vol. 5, 2016, 36.
52
Sara Dehm and Max Walden, “Refugee Policy: A Cruel Bipartisanship” in Anika
Gauja and others, eds., Double Disillusion: The 2016 Australian Federal Election,
ANU Press, 2018, 602.
53
Janet Blake, International Cultural Heritage Law, Oxford University Press, 2015,
282.
51
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of origin is better safeguarded in a new state settle more easily and start
contributing to that society more quickly.54 This idea is somewhat of a
paradox, considering many states still believe integration into the preexisting social and cultural structures is key. But one thing does not
preclude the other, and in effect studies show that they are mutually
reinforcing. There is therefore a strong incentive for safeguarding the
culture of origin of migrants and refugees. This incentive, however, is
sadly unlikely to work in short election cycles, which is how statecraft
is often measured these days, particularly with respect to refugee and
migration policy.55
Nevertheless, there are three categories of obligations that receiving
states have with respect to incoming migrant or refugee groups. Like
the obligations of states of origin, these are classified in relation to the
“lifecycle” of a migrant or refugee group in the state, thus including
the group’s arrival, their settlement or “integration”, and, if applicable,
their departure, either to return to the state of origin or to a new territory.
With respect to the group’s arrival, the key obligation upon the
receiving state is to allow entry of artifacts belonging to said group.
This obligation largely mirrors the one discussed in the previous section
with respect to the group’s departure from their state of origin, and the
same test is drawn from international human rights law as to the relative
importance of the artifact to that group’s culture applies. But there are
also some important caveats. One of them is that, under the terms of
the 1970 Convention, the state would be under the obligation to return
the object to the state of origin if it has been brought into their territory
without a valid export permit.56 However, if the group in question is
being persecuted, particularly on cultural grounds (widely understood
here, to include at least religion and ethnicity), then the state of origin
is unlikely to issue the export permit, particularly if the state also sees
itself as having a claim (based on cultural or economic considerations)
over the artifact. In this instance, it is upon the receiving state to consider
their obligations under the 1970 Convention among their duties to these
migrants or refugees, which includes an obligation not to prevent these
54
55
56

Chechi, see note 52, 28.
See generally Dehm and Walden, see note 53.
1970 Convention, Art. 7.
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groups from maintaining their cultural links.57 Therefore, the biologyculture gap needs to be bridged so that a claim over a cultural artefact
be understood not simply as a claim over an object belonging to a state
(the framing in the 1970 Convention, read in isolation), but rather as
the balancing of the interest of a state over an object versus the group’s
right to their cultural identity.
Moreover, there are obligations upon the receiving state as the
group settles into the social and cultural environment of the receiving
state. These have been articulated by the United Nations Committee
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) with respect to the
right to participate in cultural life.58
The CESCR issued a general comment to this provision in 2009,59
which discusses the scope of the right to participate in cultural life
more broadly. Importantly, this general comment discusses the rights
of migrants to participate in cultural life. The Committee indicated that
states:
“should pay particular attention to the protection of the cultural identities
of migrants, as well as their language, religion and folklore, and of their
right to hold cultural, artistic and intercultural events. States parties
should not prevent migrants from maintaining their cultural links with
their countries of origin”60

This provision is in line with the language in the CRMW.61 Note
that the CESCR puts particular emphasis on intangible cultural heritage
here, rather than artifacts. That may be because intangible cultural
heritage is less controversial in relation to migrants and refugees
(since the protection of movable cultural heritage, as discussed in the
previous paragraph, could run afoul of obligations under the 1970
CRMW Art. 31.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signature 16 December 1966, 993 UNTS 3 (entered into force 3 January 1976), Art. 15(a).
59
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General comment No. 21:
Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21 (21 December 2009) (General Comment No. 21).
60
Ibid, para. 34.
61
CRMW, Art. 45: “1. Members of the families of migrant workers shall, in the State
of employment, enjoy equality of treatment with nationals of that State in relation to:
… (d) Access to and participation in cultural life.”
57
58
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Convention). But it is also the case that intangible cultural heritage
is more important to this moment of an immigrant or refugee group’s
journey in the receiving state, and that human rights apply more directly
to the residence of the group in the receiving state, rather than the exact
moment of their entry. Nevertheless, museums in the receiving state
can play an important role, even if one must be wary that they do not
overstep their mandate and become the sole authorizers of migrant or
refugee heritage, as discussed above.62
The CESCR also indicates that states have an obligation:
“to facilitate the right of everyone to take part in cultural life by taking a
wide range of positive measures, including financial measures, that would
contribute to the realization of this right”

which includes taking:
“appropriate measures or programmes to support minorities or other
communities, including migrant communities, in their efforts to preserve
their culture.”63

International jurisprudence has acknowledged the right of migrant
communities to maintain their cultural ties in spite of restrictions in the
receiving state, through the right to freedom of expression64 and the
right to freedom of association.65 In this connection, there is also an
obligation upon states to take :
“appropriate measures to remedy structural forms of discrimination so as
to ensure that the underrepresentation of persons from certain communities
in public life does not adversely affect their right to take part in cultural
life.”66

In other words, it is upon the state not only to facilitate the
preservation of migrant culture, but also to ensure that these groups
Naguib, see note 41, 2187 (suggesting that “[u]ltimately, it is the museum who sets
the structure on which to construct the heritage of migration and diasporas and who
decides on its sustainability.”).
63
General Comment No. 21, para. 52(f).
64
European Court of Human Rights, Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v Sweden
(Application No 23883/06), Judgment of 16 December 2008.
65
European Court of Human Rights, Sidiropoulos and Others v Greece (Application
No. 26695/ 95), Judgment of 10 July 1998; European Court of Human Rights, Gorzelik and Others v Poland (Application No. 44158/98), Judgment of 17 February 2004.
66
General Comment No. 21, para. 52(g).
62
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can participate in public life, and that the structural causes behind
their persecution are addressed by the receiving state. This obligation
is further compounded when there are intersectionality factors at play,
such as the case of migrant or refugee children,67 older persons,68 or
women.69 A few promising examples already exist in local practice,
but they are more often than not restricted to major metropolitan areas
and are still to have a widespread impact on national law- and policymaking.70
Lastly, receiving states also have obligations vis-à-vis these migrant
and refugee groups should they ever decide to leave, either back to
their state of origin, or elsewhere. In this context, they become the state
of origin, and the obligations discussed in the previous section apply.
It is important here to bear in mind that these groups have the right to
take their artifacts with them, even if the receiving state, in an effort to
protect said artifacts in the interest of the migrant or refugee groups,
or by virtue of this group’s integration and role in the social structures
of the broader polity, considers said artifacts to also be part of their
national heritage.
This survey of existing and aspirational obligations of both states
of origin and receiving states of migrant and refugee groups shows that
there is a wide range of international legal obligations that, interpreted
International Labor Organization, Convention Concerning Migrations in Abusive
Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant
Workers, opened for signature 24 June 1975, 1120 UNTS 324 (entered into force 9
December 1978), Art. 12: “Each Member shall, by methods appropriate to national
conditions and practice … (f) take all steps to assist and encourage the efforts of migrant workers and their families to preserve their national and ethnic identity and their
cultural ties with their country of origin, including the possibility for children to be
given some knowledge of their mother tongue…”
68
Laia Colomer, “Managing the heritage of immigrants. Elderly refugees, homesickness, and cultural identities”, The European Archaeologist, vol. 39, 2013.
69
United Nations Human Rights Council, “Report of the Special Rapporteur in the
field of cultural rights – Karima Bennoune”, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/59 (3 February
2016), para. 38.
70
For instance, see Clara Arokiasamy, “Embedding shared heritage: the cultural heritage rights of London’s African and Asian diaspora communities”, International Journal of Heritage Studies vol. 18, no. 3, 2012. Cf. Luann Good Gingrich, “Preserving
Cultural Heritage in the Context of Migratory Livelihoods”, International Migration
vol. 52, no. 3, 2014 (focusing on Mennonite migration to rural Canada).
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systemically, provide important guidance with respect to the importance
to accommodate and protect the culture and heritage of these groups.
This protection arises not out of alignment between these groups and
a territorial state’s rights under international law, but it is rather based
on the rights that migrant and refugee groups enjoy themselves, and
obligations owed to them by states. The gap between culture and biology
presents a major obstacle in identifying and applying these rights and
obligations, though. The imperative to preserve the heritage of migrant
and refugee groups highlights the shortcomings of this gap, alongside
other basic pillars of international legal ordering, within and beyond the
specific domain of cultural heritage law, to address the challenges of the
Anthropocene.
VI. RETHINKING TERRITORIALITY AND STATEHOOD AS
LINCHPINS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CULTURE
As indicated above, the territorial paradigm permeates cultural
heritage and its safeguarding in international law, effectively preventing
the recognition of the mobility of cultures that is so important to
protecting, promoting, and fulfilling the rights of migrants and refugees.
That link between heritage and territory, though, is not historically
a given, and its contingencies need to be understood as a means of
unpacking the possibilities of culture and (re)imagining international
law in this area.71 Further, the idea of community coalescing its culture
around territorially-based constructs has long been surpassed,72 even if
UNESCO-era international law enshrines that type of understanding.
And, since culture plays a key (if often underestimated) role in
international law and relations,73 it is worth considering the implications
of our rethinking of the relationship between culture and international
law beyond cultural heritage law.
On the importance of contingencies in international legal thinking, see Ingo Venzke, “What If? Counterfactual (Hi)Stories of International Law”, Asian Journal of
International Law (advance publication 2017).
72
Werbner, see note 38, 216.
73
Jacinta O’Hagan, “Conflict, Convergence or Co-existence? The Relevance of Culture in Reframing World Order”, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, vol.
9, 1999.
71
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Focusing on the history of state succession with respect to tangible
cultural heritage, Andrzej Jakubowski has examined extensive practice
regarding the movement of cultural artifacts and their relationship to
peoples in contexts of fluid or moving state borders. Territoriality, he
acknowledges, is a key principle connecting people, land, and heritage,
going as far back as the nineteenth century. However, this principle
evolved to make territory but a proxy for the idea of nation-state, when
it came to cultural heritage.74 Particularly in the aftermath of World War
II, state boundaries were in flux, and entire national or ethnic groups
had been displaced as a result of the conflict. Thus, strict territoriality
gave way to the recognition of the primacy of collective cultural rights,
and cultural heritage was meant to follow the fate of these displaced
groups.75 This idea, central as it was for the conceptual understanding of
the relevance of heritage in the context of new and changing states, was
not explicitly inserted in relevant arrangements, and, when UNESCO
started undertaking the codification of international law in the area of
cultural heritage protection and safeguarding, territorial provenance
was reaffirmed and enshrined by default in the regime we today apply
in international law with respect to culture.76
Key in this story is that the link between culture and territory is not
a given, nor is it necessary; rather, it is a default position of a statecentric international law. That it was subsequently reinforced during the
decolonization process is relevant, but not essential, to understanding the
purpose of international heritage law. During the decolonization process
of Africa and Asia in the decades immediately after the foundation of
the United Nations, the connection to territory was reinforced as a proxy
for the emerging nation-state, but, in effect, heritage was needed to
restore and galvanize the identity of the peoples of these new countries,
much as it was important for the national identity of successor states in
the nineteenth century.77
That territory was chosen has more to do with the limits of the
decolonization itself than with heritage. More specifically, the formation
of new states was closely tied to the uti possidetis principle, meaning
74
75
76
77

Jakubowski, see note 28, 322.
Ibid, 323.
Ibid.
Ibid, 52.
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boundaries set by colonial powers, in full disregard of pre-existing
ethnic or cultural lines, needed to be respected. Therefore, in the absence
of unified cultural polities in these newly independent states, territory
became the common denominator. That in itself, though, enacts colonial
violence, and, if we are serious about overcoming these legacies, then
we should be willing to let go of territoriality in this area, and embrace
the fact that, as we already knew before the United Nations was
founded, culture and cultural heritage belong with peoples, rather than
with land. Heritage gives people its continuity, rather than give territory
its stability.78 That the two align is more a matter of coincidence and
colonial violence than one of purpose. In fact, even the International
Court of Justice (notably conservative in basic matters of international
law) has, in a recent case, recognized that culture and territory can be
separated.79
In the context of the Anthropocene, decoupling heritage from
territory means that migrant and refugee groups are entitled to the
full gamut of their cultural rights, and entitlements to the heritage that
binds them together as a community. Thus, states of origin must allow
these groups to carry their own heritage with them if they are in fact
abandoning the polity as a group, and resettle said heritage in their new
country. Likewise, the receiving state should accommodate the new
heritage of the entering migrant or refugee group, not only by protecting
their right to keep their artifacts, but also by creating the conditions
through which their intangible cultural heritage can be practiced and
safeguarded. It is in the interest of the receiving state, after all, that
these entering groups feel welcome and accepted, and, as numerous
examples show, the heritage of migrant and refugee groups often does
become deeply enmeshed with the pre-existing heritage of that polity.
That the law as is does not reflect that common wisdom has more to do
with the law being dated than it being a disincentive or prohibition to
receiving state action.
Thinking about international law’s relationship to culture and
cultural heritage more broadly, we have that international cultural
Ibid, 44-45.
International Court of Justice, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso / Niger), Judgment
of 16 April 2013.
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heritage law, and the imperative of safeguarding the culture of migrant
and refugee groups, helps us understand the artificiality of the ties
between international legal rights and obligations to territory. As territory
becomes an increasingly threatened constant in the Anthropocene,
international law would do well to rethink this artificial and contingent
relationship, and to allow itself to become the instrument of human
emancipation the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have promised,
but are yet to fulfill.
Decoupling international law on culture from territory also implies
diminishing the overwhelming influence of state sovereignty on the
field.80 An authority vacuum is thus created, and one that could and
should aptly be filled by other representatives of the international
community whose interest is not on their immediate state-centric
institutional interests, but who can act as spokespeople for affected
communities. Ideally, of course, communities themselves would have
a voice in decision making about their heritage in the context of forced
relocation, but, should that not be possible, international or regional
organizations can act as their representatives, as long as they understand
that their focus is not on the protection of their own existence, that of
a class of experts, or of heritage as an end in itself. Rather, the goal is
to promote the cultural heritage of migrant and refugee communities
in these communities’ own terms, and for their benefit wherever they
relocate.

VII. CONCLUSION
The rise of the Anthropocene presents a number of challenges to
international law. But with challenges come opportunities to overcome
Alternatively, with the emergence of deterritorialized states, things can remain the
same. See Rosemary Rayfuse and Emily Crawford, “Climate Change and Statehood”
in Rosemary Rayfuse and Shirley V. Scott, eds., International Law in the Era of Climate Change, Edward Elgar Publishers, 2012; Maxine Burkett, “The Nation Ex-Situ:
On climate change, deterritorialized nationhood and the post-climate era”, Climate
Law, no. 2, 2011, 369 (arguing that “”cultural identity will survive territory even at a
significant distance”).
80
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internal barriers to international legal ordering that predated our
imminent predicament as a civilization. Chief among them, as this
article has shown, is the divide in international law between culture
and biology. This divide creates a sense of immediacy and crisis in
international law that is short-sighted and prevents international law
from achieving its own objectives by obscuring key elements that
need to be taken into account when addressing the needs of human
communities. Flowing from that gap is international law’s insistence
on individual (and thus easily translated into biological) over group
(inherently cultural) interests being at the forefront of international
legal efforts.
But a brief look into the evolution of applicable norms underscores
their contingencies, and shows that, much like the biology-culture
divide, territoriality as a necessary link between cultural heritage in
international law is also not a given. Breaking away from this link
allows us to effectively safeguard the culture and heritage of migrant
groups, and, most importantly, it serves as a powerful reminder to
ourselves of international law’s purpose. Culture can be a bridge
towards humanity, and beyond the increasingly artificial constructs
and anchors of statehood and territoriality, but we need to remember
that culture is only as good as the community that practices, lives, and
carries it onwards.
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